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We present a model which combines elements of an auction and a rent-seeking
contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they
also have to submit a bid which is payable onlyif they win the prize. First, we ana-
lyze the model if the returns-to-scale parameters of both bids and efforts are unity.
We present a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of a unique Nash
equilibrium.In the equilibriumeach player submits the same bid, while the sum of
alleffortsequalsthatbid.Second,weanalyzethecaseinwhichthereturns-to-scale
parameters may differ from unity, and derive the implications of that speciﬁcation.
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11. Introduction
In many economic situations, a number of contestants try to obtain some prize or rent.
Several mechanisms can be used to assign a prize to one of the competitors. One obvious
way to do so is through a regular auction. Then, all contestants submit a bid and, as a
rule, the one submitting the highest bid obtains the prize, and pays an amount that depends
in some pre-described way on the total vector of bids. In the simplest case, the highest
bidder pays his own bid, whereas the other bidders pay nothing. For recent surveys of this
literature, see e.g. Wolfstetter (1996) or Klemperer (1999). Another possible mechanism
is the following. In the case of policy decisions, the parties involved often exert effort in
an attempt to inﬂuence the decision process. This effort can take the form of lobbying,
but can also consist of bribes. Such a process can be modelled as an all-pay auction or a
rent-seeking contest. In an all-pay auction (see e.g. Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1993),
all contestants have to pay for their effort, and the one with the highest effort wins the
auction. In a rent-seeking contest, all players also exert some effort, but the outcome of the
process is stochastic: each contestant wins with a probability that is increasing in his own
effort, but decreasing in that of his competitors. The extensive literature on such contests
started with Tullock (1980). See further e.g. Dixit (1987), Hillman and Riley (1989), and
for a comprehensive survey, Nitzan (1994).
Yet, in practice, we often have situations that lie somewhere between the two extremes
of auctions and rent seeking. Often, when an auction is held, the outcome is not solely
determined by the height of the bid. In most cases, other aspects of the competing offers
also play a role. In public procurement, the quality of the offers made is also taken into
account, usually by some predeﬁned rule that weighs different quantiﬁable quality criteria
of the offers made. Another example is the procedure by which major sports events, such
as the Olympic Games, are assigned to cities or countries. On the one hand, this decision
is determined by bids the contestants submit, which come in the form of e.g. the quality
or quantity of new stadiums and infrastructure. Yet, there is probably also room for some
lobbying or bribing of the decision makers. A ﬁnal example is a takeover battle. Suppose
two ﬁrms try to take over a third ﬁrm. Both ﬁrms submit a bid. Shareholders decide whom
to tender their shares to. Yet, they will usually base their decisions not only on the bids
submitted, but also on the extent to which they feel each ﬁrm contributes to the long-term
prospects of the ﬁrm being taken over.1 Thus, often, even if an auction is held, there is still
room for lobbying or rent seeking to try to inﬂuence the outcome of the auction.
In this paper, we try to model this notion. We build on the rent-seeking literature, but
assume that the probability of winning not only depends on the effort exerted, but also
on the bid made. In section 2, we describe our general framework, and show that it can
be seen as an extension of the standard rent-seeking game. In section 3, we consider the
simplest possible version of our model in which returns-to-scale parameters of both bids
1 A related example: in a recent hostile takeover battle, the British telephone company Vodafone bid some
132 billion euro to obtain control of its German rival Mannesmann. Reportedly, both ﬁrms set aside a total
amount of 850 million euro for this ﬁght, trying to inﬂuence the voting behavior of shareholders. From this
amount, 150 million was reserved for advertising. See The Economist (2000).
2and efforts are equal to unity. For a given number of players, we present a necessary and
sufﬁcient condition for the existence of a unique (Nash) equilibrium in which all players
participate in the contest. We show that in that equilibrium (a) each player submits the
same bid, (b) the sum of all outlays equals that bid, and (c) there is underdissipation of
rent. Furthermore, we give explicit equilibrium solutions for the case of equal valuations,
and for the case in which there are only two contestants. Section 4 uses a more general
model, in which the returns-to-scale parameters of bids and efforts may differ from unity,
and derives the implications of that speciﬁcation. If an equilibrium in which all players
participate exists, it now has that the sum of all individual ratios of the effort and bid,
equals the ratio of the returns-to-scale parameters associated with efforts and bids. We
further present a sufﬁcient condition for the existence of an equilibrium of this model for
the case of equal valuations. Section 5 concludes.
2. The general model
Our basic model is the following. There are n players trying to obtain some prize. Player
i values the prize at vi > 0: We thus allow for asymmetric valuations. Each player can
submit a bid bi  0, and spend effort ei  0: The bid bi only has to be paid if i wins the
prize. However, outlays ei are sunk. A player cannot retrieve these, regardless of whether
or not he wins the prize. In general, we assume that the probability pi that i wins is given
by the logit form contest success function




;i D 1 ;:::;n; (1)
if bj > 0a n de j >0 for at least one j;and pi D 0 if that is not the case. Here, f.b i;e i/is
non-negative, and @f=@bi;@ f= @e i0 :This implies @pi=@bi;@ p i=@ei  0; and @pi=@bj;
@pi=@ej  0( j6D i). Thus, based on the bid bi and the outlays ei, a ‘score’ f.b i;e i/is
computed for each player. The probability that a certain player wins this contest, is equal
to the share of his score in the total sum of scores. Note that these probabilities sum to
unity.2 Given (1), player i wants to maximize his expected payoff, which is given by
5i D pi .vi − bi/ − ei: (2)
This expression reﬂects that the bid only has to be paid if the player wins the prize, whereas
the outlays are non-refundable.
A natural assumption is that the score f.b i;e i/ links bi and ei in some multiplicative
fashion. In that way, we capture the idea that there is a trade-off between increasing bid
bi and increasing effort ei: In section 3, we simply assume f.b i;e i/ D b ie i,w h i c hw e
loosely denote as a constant-returns-to-scale score (note that if the size of either bi or ei
is increased with a certain multiplicative factor, then the score is increased with this same
2 As long as at least one player both submits a positive bid and exerts a positive effort. We assume that the
contest is cancelled, i.e. the prize is not awarded at all, if none of the players both submits a positive bid and
exerts a positive effort.
3factor as well). Note also that in that case, the probability that player i wins the prize is
equal to zero if he submits a zero bid or exerts no effort. In section 4, we use a more general
Cobb-Douglas score function f.b i;e i/Db 
ie

i;with ; > 0 returns-to-scale parameters
of, respectively, the bids and efforts. Such a more general function, however, leads to a less
tractable model.







Many papers in this literature assume g.ei/ D ei: Hillman and Riley (1989) analyze this
model, allowing for n contestants and asymmetric valuations. Ellingsen (1991) gives an
application. Our model in section 3 can be seen as a generalization of this approach. Some
papers, including Tullock (1980), use a more general contest success function g.ei/ D er
i;
with r>0. Nti (1999) analyzes this model, allowing for asymmetric valuations, but re-
stricting attention to the case n D 2: Our model in section 4 generalizes this approach.
Finally, we refer to Skaperdas (1996) and Kooreman and Schoonbeek (1997) for a gen-
eral discussion of the foundations of logit form contest success functions in rent-seeking
models.
3. A constant-returns-to-scale score







.vi − bi/ − ei (4)
if bj > 0a n de j >0 for at least one j,a n d5 iD0 otherwise. We want to investigate the
(Nash) equilibria of the resulting model.
Without loss of generality, we ﬁrst order the valuations such that v1  v2  :::  v n.












for 0 <b<v n:Observe that hn.b/ is strictly increasing in b: Moreover, limb#0 hn.b/ D
−1; and limb"vn D1 :This implies that hn.b/ has a unique root, b.n/ say, on .0;v n/,i . e .
h n.b.n// D 0. Using this, we present the following theorem which provides a necessary
and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of a unique equilibrium in which all n players
participate, and which, moreover, gives general characteristics of such an equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1 Let the valuations be v1  v2  :::  v n:There exists an equilibrium
.O b1;:::;O b n; O e 1;:::;O e n/in which all n players participate, i.e. with O bi > 0 and O ei > 0,
48i; if and only if the unique root b.n/ of the function hn.b/ as deﬁned in (5) satisﬁes
b . n /<v n= 2 . If such an equilibrium exists, it is unique and the bids and efforts satisfy:
(i) O bi D O b D b.n/;8i,
(ii) O ei D
O b.vi−2O b/
.vi−O b/ , 8i,
(iii)
Pn
iD1 O ei D O b.
PROOF. See the Appendix. 2
Thus, in this model, where not only efforts but also bids determine the probability of
winning the prize, all players submit the same bid in the equilibrium, regardless of their
valuation. This implies that in equilibrium, the fact that bids are submitted does not play
a role, i.e. differences in the success probabilities are solely determined by differences in
the outlays O ei:
We also have that in equilibrium the bid every participant submits, equals the sum of total
outlays. The equilibrium bid is less than one half of the smallest valuation, vn. Further-
more, using (i) of Theorem 3.1 and (5), we see that the equilibrium bid is strictly increas-
ing in the size of the valuations of the players, i.e. @ O b=@vi > 0, 8i (note that for ﬁxed b,
the ﬁrst term on the RHS of (5) strictly decreases if one marginally increases the valuation
vi, whereas the second term remains constant). It also follows that the equilibrium bid and
efforts are linear homogeneous in the valuations, in the sense that if all valuations increase
with a same factor, then the equilibrium bid and efforts all increase with this factor as well.
Using Theorem 3.1, we further see that O e1 O e 2:::O e n . Thus, the higher the valuation
of a player, the greater the effort he exerts in the equilibrium. It can also be veriﬁed that in
the equilibrium the probability that player i wins the prize equals O pi DO e i= O b . This implies
that O p1 O p 2 :::O p n> 0. As a result, the player with the highest valuation also has
the highest probability to win the prize. The expected proﬁt of player i corresponding to
the equilibrium can be expressed as
b 5i D
.vi − 2O b/2
.vi − O b/
: (6)
Consequently, we obtain that b 51  b 52  :::b 5 n >0.
Theorem 3.1 considers equilibria in which all players participate in the contest. However,
for arbitrary valuations, the root b.n/ 2 .0;v n/of hn.b/ of (5) does not always satisfy
b . n /<v n= 2. 3 In that case, an equilibrium with all n participating players does not exist.
The same kind of problem appears in the standard rent-seeking model with unequal valu-
ations. To handle this problem, Hillman and Riley (1989) propose an intuitively appealing
procedure in which only players with the highest valuations decide to participate in the
contest. Applying a similar procedure to our model, we can state that agents n; n − 1;:::
will sequentially drop out of the contest until, for some agent k; we have b.k/ < vk=2;
3T a k e e . g . v 1 D 5, v2 D 4a n dv 3D2. Then b.3/  1:134 >v 3= 2.












for 0 <b<v k:In that case the equilibrium bid with the k players 1;:::;kis given by this
root.
Admittedly, this procedure, although appealing, has a drawback.4 Suppose for example
that n D 5; but there is no equilibrium with all ﬁve players participating. Then, rather
for the player with the lowest valuation to drop out, it may also be an equilibrium for the
player with the second-lowest valuation to drop out. If he does, the condition just given
may be satisﬁed for the player with the lowest valuation.5
In the next two subsections, we demonstrate that the condition b . n /<v n= 2 holds — and
thus that there exists a unique equilibrium in which all players participate — if either all
valuations are equal or n D 2. Note that the latter implies that if we have a case in which
there is no equilibrium with n>2 players participating, then the above procedure in
which players with the lowest valuations sequentially drop out, certainly provides us with
an equilibrium.
Concluding this section, we discuss the extent of rent dissipation that occurs in the equilib-
rium of Theorem 3.1. First note that, in order to study rent dissipation, we need a deﬁnition
for that magnitude in the context of our model. In the rent-seeking literature, the extent of
rent dissipation is deﬁned as the total sum of outlays of the contestants trying to obtain
the prize. Yet, in our model, there is also a bid O b paid by the winner. Arguably, this should
not be counted as rent dissipation, since it merely consists of a transfer from the winner
of the prize to the authority selling the prize. On the other hand, one can argue that, when
O ei consists of bribes rather than efforts, then these bribes are also merely transfers. We
therefore consider both possibilities. First, suppose that the winning bid is considered as
dissipated rent. Total rent dissipation then equals D D
P
i O ei C O b. Using Theorem 3.1, it
follows that D D 2O b<v n . Thus, in this case there is always underdissipation of rent, in
the sense that total rent dissipation is less than the size of (even) the smallest valuation of
the prize. Second, if we suppose that the winning bid is not considered as dissipated rent,
then total rent dissipation, D0 say, satisﬁes D0 D 1
2D<1
2 v n . Obviously, again there is
always underdissipation of rent.
3.1 The case of equal valuations
Let us now consider the case in which all players have the same valuation. We then obtain
the following corollary of Theorem 3.1.
4 Note that this proviso also holds for Hillman and Riley (1989) proposition 5, even though they fail to
point this out.
5 To illustrate this possibility for the case n D 3, take again the valuations of footnote 3. There is no
equilibrium in which all three players participate. However, for each combination of two players there exists
a well-deﬁned equilibrium. See Corollary 3.2 below.
6Corollary 3.1 If vi D v;8i, then a unique equilibrium exists. The equilibrium bids and
efforts are given by:
(i) O bi D O b D
.n−1/v
.2n−1/;8i,
(ii) O ei DO eD
.n−1/v
.2n−1/n;8i.
PROOF.U s i n g v i D v , 8 i , it follows that the root b.n/ of the function hn.b/,d e ﬁ n e di n
(5), is equal to b.n/ D .n − 1/v=.2n − 1/, thus b . n /<v = 2. From Theorem 3.1, there is
a unique equilibrium. Moreover, from part (i) of Theorem 3.1, the equilibrium bids equal
O bi D b.n/, 8i, hence part (i) of the corollary. Finally, invoking symmetry, i.e. O ei DO e ,8 i ,
part (ii) of the corollary follows from part (iii) of Theorem 3.1. 2
Since, for this case, we do have explicit solutions for O b and O ei; we can also explicitly char-
acterize the extent of rent dissipation that occurs in the equilibrium. From Corollary 3.1,
if the winning bid is considered as dissipated rent, then total rent dissipation is 2
3v with
n D 2; and it strictly increases to v as n goes to inﬁnity. If the winning bid is not consid-
ered as dissipated rent, then total rent dissipation is 1
3v with n D 2; and it strictly increases
to 1
2v as n goes to inﬁnity.
Next, we recall that total rent dissipation equals .n − 1/v=n in the standard rent-seeking
model, see e.g. Hillman and Riley (1989). Thus, in our model, total rent dissipation is
lower than in the standard rent-seeking model when O b is not considered as dissipated rent,
but higher when O b is considered as dissipated rent.
For the standard rent-seeking model, in equilibrium it can be shown that e
i D e D
.n − 1/v=n2;8i, see again Hillman and Riley (1989). The expected proﬁt of contestant i
then equals 









In a regular auction, it is easy to see that each player would bid the common valuation of
the prize (v), leaving expected proﬁts equal to zero. Therefore, in our auction with rent
seeking, expected proﬁts for contestants are higher than in a regular auction, but lower
than in a standard rent-seeking contest.
3.2 The case of two players
Next, we return to the general model in which valuations are allowed to differ, but restrict
attention to the case of two contestants, thus n D 2. We then have the following corollary
of Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.2 If n D 2, then a unique equilibrium exists. The equilibrium bids and
efforts are given by:







(ii) O ei D
O b.vi−2O b/
.vi−O b/ ,
7for i D 1;2. Substituting O b into (ii), we have an explicit solution for O ei:
PROOF.T a k i n g n D 2, it can be veriﬁed that the root b.2/ of the function h2.b/ deﬁned










Again, without loss of generality, assume that v1  v2: We then have to show that b.2/<
v 2= 2, i.e. v2 − 2b.2/>0. Now,








2 − 3v1v2: (9)




2 − 3v1v2 > 2v1 − v2: (10)
With v1  v2; the RHS of this expression is positive. Taking squares on both sides and
rearranging, (10) simpliﬁes to 3v2
2 > 0; which is always satisﬁed. Using Theorem 3.1, a
unique equilibrium exists. Parts (i) and (ii) of the corollary follow directly. 2
Suppose weconsider the winning bid O b as dissipated rent. Total rent dissipation then equals
D DO e 1CO e 2CO bD2O b: Nti (1999) proposes the following way to study how the extent of
asymmetry in valuation inﬂuences total rent dissipation. Without loss of generality, assume






1 C  −
p
1 −  C 2

: (11)
Observe that @D=@ > 0: Thus, the more equal valuations are (i.e. the higher  is), the
higher total rent dissipation. Yet, this analysis is in terms of a ﬁxed v1: More equal val-
uations then imply a higher v2; while keeping v1 ﬁxed. In this analysis, increased rent
dissipation is not so much due to lower asymmetry, but rather to a higher v2: This can be







1 C  −
p
1 −  C 2

: (12)
Now, @D=@ > 0: Thus, this suggests that having more equal valuations (i.e. lower )
leads to lower dissipation, since we now do the analysis in terms of a ﬁxed v2 rather than
aﬁ x e dv 1:
A better way to study the effect of a decrease in asymmetry is the following. Suppose the
sum of valuations of both contestants is ﬁxed: v1 C v2 D V:Using v1  v2; we may write
v1 D V and v2 D .1 − /V; with  2T 1
2 ; 1 /: We can study the effect of decreased
asymmetry as a decrease in , without the problem of scale effects that affect the analyses
above.



















Thus, rent dissipation is maximized when  D 1
2; i.e. when the two valuations are equal.
Further, @D=@ < 0f o ra l l2. 1
2;1 / . Therefore, with two players, we unambiguously
have that more equal valuations lead to higher total rent dissipation. Remark that this result
does not hinge on the deﬁnition of rent dissipation. It does not matter whether or not we
count O b as dissipated rent. If we do not, total rent dissipation simply equals D0 D 1
2D:
4. A general Cobb-Douglas score
In the previous section, we analyzed a model where the returns-to-scale parameters as-
sociated with both bidding and rent seeking equal unity. In this section, we use the more
general Cobb-Douglas score function f.b i;e i/ D b 
ie

i. The returns-to-scale parameters
satisfy ; > 0: Hence, the model analyzed in the previous section is a special case of












.vi − bi/ − ei (15)
if bj > 0a n de j >0 for at least one j,a n d5 iD0 otherwise.
For this model we have the following general result.
Theorem 4.2 Consider an equilibrium .O b1;:::;O b n; O e 1;:::;O e n/in which all n players












PROOF. See the Appendix. 2
Thus, if wehave an equilibrium in which all players participate, then the sum ofall individ-
ual ratios of the equilibrium effort and equilibrium bid, equals the ratio of the returns-to-
scale parameters associated with efforts and bids. Thistheorem has anatural interpretation.
As ;the parameter that reﬂects returns to scale with respect to the efforts increases, then
efforts become more important, in the sense that the sum of the individual ratios of the
equilibrium effort and equilibrium bid increases. Also, as ; the parameter that reﬂects
returns to scale with respect to bids increases, then bids become more important, in the
sense that the sum of the individual ratios of the equilibrium effort and equilibrium bid
decreases.
In order to analyse this model further, we make in the next subsection the simplifying
assumption that all contestants have equal valuations. We remark that (even) for the case
9of two players, it is in general not possible to ﬁnd the equilibrium in closed form.6
4.1 Equal valuations
Suppose that, in the model described above, all players have equal valuations. We then
have the following result.
Theorem 4.3 Suppose that vi D v;8i, and   1. Then there exists a unique equilib-
rium. In particular, the equilibrium bids and efforts are given by:
(i) O bi D O b D
.n−1/v
.n−1/Cn;8i;




PROOF. See the Appendix. 2
In other words, when valuations are equal,   1 is a sufﬁcient condition for the existence
of a unique equilibrium, which is given by parts (i) and (ii) of Theorem 4.3.
We make the following remarks with respect to the equilibrium bids and efforts of Theo-
rem 4.3. First, the bids and efforts are linear homogeneous in the valuation v. Second, if the
returns-to-scale parameter of bids, , increases, then the equilibrium bids strictly increase
as well, whereas the equilibrium efforts strictly decrease. Third, if the returns-to-scale pa-
rameter of efforts, , increases, then the equilibrium efforts strictly increase; however,
there is no effect on the equilibrium bids. Fourth, in the equilibrium the probability that












which is positive, because we assumed that   1.
Using Theorem 4.3, we can again study the extent to which rent is dissipated. To begin
with, suppose that the winning bid is considered as dissipated rent. We then have from
Theorem 4.3 that
D D nO e C O b D
. C /.n − 1/v
.n−1/Cn
: (18)
Consequently, with two contestants, total rent dissipation is .C/v=.C2/: Theextent of
rent dissipation strictly increases to . C /v=.C1/as ngoes to inﬁnity. Rent dissipation








which is positive, since by assumption   1.
6 In the special case where  D 1, bids are again equal among agents, regardless of the size of .T h i s
follows from (A.19) of the Appendix. The results given in section 3 can easily be generalized to this special
case. However, if  6D 1, bids are no longer equal among agents.
10Next, suppose we do not count the winning bid as dissipated rent. From Theorem 4.3 we
then obtain




With two contestants, total rent dissipation now equals v=. C 2/. The extent of rent
dissipation strictly increases to v=. C1/ as n goes to inﬁnity. Rent dissipation strictly
decreases in ; but strictly increases in :
We conclude with two remarks. First, we see that total rent dissipation strictly increases in
 if the winning bid is considered as dissipated rent, whereas total rent dissipation strictly
decreases in  if the winning bid is not regarded as dissipated rent. Second, it is easy to
verify that if the winning bid is considered as dissipated rent, then in equilibrium there is
underdissipation of rent. Obviously, this conclusion then also holds if the winning bid is
not considered as dissipated rent.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a model which combines elements of an auction and a rent-
seeking contest. The model considers a situation in which players compete for a prize. The
probability that a player wins the prize depends not only on the amount of effort exerted,
but also on the bid submitted. The bid only has to be paid if the player wins the prize, the
effort outlays are sunk.
First, we discussed the model with constant returns to scale in both bids and outlays.
We presented a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of a unique (Nash)
equilibrium in which all players participate. We found that in the equilibrium all players
will submit the samebid, regardless oftheir valuations, and that total outlays equal that bid.
Moreover, we found underdissipation of rent, even if the winning bid is also considered as
dissipated rent. For the two player case, we showed that the extent of total rent dissipation
is strictly decreasing in the extent of asymmetry in valuations.
Second, we studied a more general model, in which the probability of success depends on
a general Cobb-Douglas function in bids and efforts. For that model, we demonstrated that
the sum of the individual ratios of the equilibrium effort and equilibrium bid is equal to
the ratio of their respective returns-to-scale parameters. Focusing on the case of equal val-
uations, we showed that the model has an equilibrium if the returns-to-scale parameter of
efforts isnot greater than unity. Weshowed that in the equilibrium there is underdissipation
of rent, even if the winning bid is also considered as dissipated rent. Total rent dissipation
strictly increases in the returns-to-scale parameter of efforts. Finally, if the winning bid is
considered as dissipated rent, then total rent dissipation strictly increases in the returns-to-
scale parameter of bids, whereas if the winning bid is not considered as dissipated rent,
total rent dissipation is strictly decreasing in this parameter.
11Appendix: Proofs of Theorems 3.1, 4.2 and 4.3
Proof of Theorem 3.1
To begin with, we state the ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior solution of the expected




























2 −1 D0: (A.2)
Note that while stating these ﬁrst-order conditions, we assume that bj > 0a n de j >0f o r
at least one j 6D i.
Now, assume that .O b1;:::;O b n;O e 1;:::;O e n/is an equilibrium with O bi > 0a n dO e i >0, 8i:
We then have to show that b . n /<v n= 2—w h e r eb.n/ is the root of hn.b/ as deﬁned in (5)
— and that equilibrium bids and efforts satisfy parts (i), (ii) and (iii) of the theorem. Using
the ﬁrst-order conditions (A.1) and (A.2), in the equilibrium we must have O bi <v i= 2, 8i.








































Substituting (A.3) into (A.4) yields O b2
i
P












O bj O ej: (A.5)
The RHS of (A.5) is a constant, independent of i. Using this we can write O b for the bid of






12In turn, using O bi D O b, 8i, and (A.6), (A.3) implies

O b2 − O bO ei

.vi − O b/ D O b3, so we can
solve O ei, 8i, as a function of O b,
O ei D
O b.vi − 2O b/
.vi − O b/
: (A.7)




vj − 2O b

















vj − O b
!
D n − 1: (A.9)
From (A.9), O b is a root of hn.b/ of (5). Since hn.b/ has a unique root, O b D b.n/,a n dw e
must have b.n/ < vn=2. Part (i) of the theorem is now obvious, and parts (ii) and (iii)
follow from, respectively, (A.7) and (A.6).
Next, assume that b.n/ < vn=2. We then have to prove that there exists an equilib-
rium in which all players participate. We will show that such an equilibrium is given by
.O b1;:::;O b n;O e 1;:::;O e n/,w h e r eO b i DO bDb.n/ and O ei D O b.vi − 2O b/=.vi − O b/, 8i. Remark
that these bids and efforts satisfy O bi > 0a n dO e i >0, 8i. It remains to be shown that each
player i maximizes his expected proﬁt by chosing bi D O b and ei DO e i , given the choices
O bj and O ej (j 6D i) of his rivals.
Consider the maximization problem faced by player i, given these choices of his rivals.
First, notice that if player i chooses bi D 0, then his corresponding optimal effort is equal
to zero, and his expected proﬁt amounts to zero. Second, if player i chooses ei D 0, then
his expected proﬁt equals zero irrespective of the size of his bid. Third, examine positive
bids bi and positive efforts ei of player i, which satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions (A.1) and
(A.2). It is convenient to write ci D
P
j6Di O bj O ej. Note that ci > 0. Using (A.1) and (A.2),
it follows that for such bids and efforts of player i we must have
ci.vi − bi/ D bi.biei C ci/ (A.10)
and
cibi.vi − bi/ D .biei C ci/2: (A.11)
From (A.10) we directly obtain that bi <v i= 2. Further, (A.10) and (A.11) imply that
b3







13Deﬁne the continuous auxiliary function ki.b/ D b3 − ci.vi − b/ for 0 <b<v i .B y
assumption, 0 < O b<v i = 2a n dO e i >0. Further, note that the ﬁrst-order conditions of
player i are satisﬁed if he chooses bi D O b and ei DO e i .A sar e s u l t ,bD O bmust be a root
of ki.b/,i . e .k i.O b/ D 0. Moreover, one can easily verify that ki.b/ has no other roots. By
implication, besides bi D O b and ei DO e i , there exist no other positive bid bi and positive
effort ei which satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions of player i. Finally, we observe that the






vi − O b

−O e iD
.vi − 2O b/2
.vi − O b/
(A.14)
which is clearly positive. As a result, player i indeed globally maximizes his expected
proﬁt by choosing bi D O b and ei DO e i.2
Next, we present the proofs of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3. We ﬁrst make some preliminary
remarks. The ﬁrst-order conditions of an interior solution of the expected proﬁt maximiza-
tion problem of player i in the model of section 4, given the bids bj and efforts ej .j 6D i/





















































2 .vi − bi/ − 1 D 0; (A.16)





















































Using these conditions we present the proofs of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Suppose that .O b1;:::;O b n;O e 1;:::;O e n/is an equilibrium in which all n players participate.
In the equilibrium each player’s expected proﬁt must be nonnegative, for otherwise the
player will not participate in the contest. This implies that we must have O bi <v i,8 i .W e
further know that the equilibrium must satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions (A.17) and (A.18).




































which completes the proof. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.3
Assume that vi D v, 8i,a n d1. We will show that there exists a unique equilibrium,
which is given by parts (i) and (ii) of the theorem.
To begin with, we remark that the equilibrium must be symmetric, i.e. bi D b and ei D e,
8i. It is obvious that the situation with bi D b D 0 and/or ei D e D 0, 8i, is not an
equilibrium. Further, substituting ei D e>0a n db i Db>0, 8i, into the n ﬁrst-order












This implies that there is only one possible equilibrium, i.e. bi D O bi D O b and ei DO e iDO e ,
8 i . In order to demonstrate that this indeed constitutes an equilibrium, we have to prove
that player i maximizes his expected proﬁt by choosing bi D O b and ei DO e ,g i v e nt h e
choices O bj D O b and O ej DO e. j6D i/of his rivals.
Take the maximization problem faced by player i, given these choices of his rivals. First,
we see that if player i chooses bi D 0, then his corresponding optimal effort is zero, and
hence his expected proﬁt equals zero. Second, if player i chooses ei D 0, then his expected
proﬁt is zero independent of the size of his bid. Third, let us examine positive bids bi and
positive efforts ei of player i which satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions (A.17) and (A.18). In
that case, (A.17) and (A.18) reduce to
















where for notational convenience we have deﬁned di D
P
j6Di O bO e. Note that di > 0. It
follows directly from (A.23) that we must have bi < v = . 1C/.
15Observe that (A.23) and (A.24) are satisﬁed if player i chooses bi D O b and ei DO e(note
that 0 < O b< v = . 1C/and O ei > 0). We further remark that the expected proﬁt of player












which is positive, since   1. The proof is completed if we show that besides bi D O bi
and ei DO e i , there exist for player i no other bid bi with 0 <b i< v = . 1C/ and effort
ei > 0, which satisfy (A.23) and (A.24). In order to show that, we distinguish two cases,
i.e.  D 1a n d<1.
First, take the case <1. From (A.23), we obtain that ei D si.bi/, where the continuous
auxiliary function si.b/ is deﬁned as
si.b/ D
 
di.v − . C 1/b/b−.C1/ 1
 ; (A.26)
for 0 <b< v = . 1C/. Observe that si.b/ is strictly decreasing in b, and, moreover, that
limb#0 si.b/ D1and limb" v
.1C/ si.b/ D 0.









which, in turn, with (A.23) implies that
















for 0 <b< v = . 1C/. Since in this case we have <1, ti.b/ is strictly increasing in
b, and limb#0 ti.b/ D 0. As a result, the functions si.b/ and ti.b/ have a unique point of
intersection. By implication, this unique point of intersection is given by b D O b. It follows
that for player i there exist a unique bid 0 <b i< v = . 1C/ and a unique effort ei > 0
which satisfy (A.23) and (A.24), i.e. bi D O b and ei DO e i.
Second, take the case  D 1. It then follows from (A.23) and (A.24) that
ei D






2di.v − bi/ D b
C2
i : (A.31)
It is easy to verify that bi D O b is the unique solution of (A.31). In turn, we can conclude
that for player i there exist a unique 0 <b i < v = . 1C/ and a unique effort ei > 0
which satisfy (A.23) and (A.24), i.e. bi D O b and ei DO e i.2
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